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TERMINATION-OF-PREGNANCY RIGHTS AND FOETAL INTERESTS IN 
CONTINUED EXISTENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE CHOICE ON TERMINATION 
OF PREGNANCY ACT 92 OF 1996 
C Pickles 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The aim of this article is to demonstrate that although South Africa has permissive 
termination-of-pregnancy legislation to the extent that women can terminate first- and 
second-trimester pregnancies on demand and for socio-economic reasons, foetal 
interests1 are in fact taken into account. The system of female reproductive rights 
progressively shelters foetal interests, albeit to a limited extent.  
 
At common law, legal subjectivity starts at birth and requires that the child must be 
separate from the mother's body and must survive independently of the mother after 
separation.2 Without any evidence of live birth, constitutional rights will not vest in the 
foetus. Accordingly, a tension arises between foetal interests in continued existence 
(as a non-legal subject) on the one hand, and women (as legal subjects) exercising 
their rights to autonomy by accessing termination-of-pregnancy services on the 
other. Within this framework, the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1998 
(hereafter the Choice Act) and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereafter the Constitution) will be examined in order to determine whether the 
Choice Act is a legislative entrenchment of the tension that arises or whether it 
silently balances these opposing positions.  
 
The Choice Act both advances and limits female reproductive rights. In the process 
of limiting reproductive rights, foetal interests in continued existence are brought to 
the fore and taken into account. Two main factors concerning the Choice Act will be 
considered. First, the Choice Act advances a number of constitutional rights relevant 
                                            
  Camilla Pickles. LLB, LLM (UP). LLD candidate and academic assistant at the Centre for Child 
Law, Department of Private Law, University of Pretoria. Email: camilla.pickles@up.ac.za. 
1  The term "foetal interests" specifically relates to the benefit of continued existence in an unborn 
state up to the point of live birth. This term is preferred over "foetal rights", because "foetal rights" 
implies that a foetus is vested with constitutional rights, which is not the case in South Africa. 
2  Boezaart (ed) Child Law 4-5. 
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to female autonomy. These rights play an important role in society and serve as the 
foremost reason why foetal interests are limited. Each of these rights will be 
considered contextually. Secondly, it is also accepted that the Choice Act takes 
foetal interests into account, since a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is 
gradually limited as the pregnancy progresses. In this context, the present article will 
consider when the limitation of female reproductive rights takes effect and how this 
facilitates taking foetal interests into account. On the topic of foetal interests, the 
article further questions if elective second-trimester termination of pregnancies 
serves any purposeful role. The reasons presented for the limitations are important, 
since such reasons demonstrate whether a balance is achieved or not.  
 
South Africa is in the process of successfully balancing the opposing notions of 
female reproductive rights and foetal interests.3 There are indications that a 
balancing method is in place, because two extremes are avoided; that is, pregnant 
women may not terminate late pregnancies on demand or for socio-economic 
reasons, and the state does not completely prohibit the termination of pregnancies. 
In housing values and rights the Constitution ensures that these two extremes are 
avoided. 
 
2  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act: advancing female 
reproductive rights 
 
Although the Constitution does not expressly deal with the "right to terminate a 
pregnancy",O'Sullivan states that the Choice Act gives effect to numerous 
constitutional rights that can be grouped together as female reproductive rights.4 
These rights include the rights to life, privacy, bodily and psychological integrity, 
dignity, equality, access to information and health care, and pregnant children's 
rights, and affect the right to terminate a pregnancy in South Africa. This is reflected 
in the Preamble of the Choice Act, where these rights are recognised as important 
elements in promoting reproductive rights and in extending the freedom of choice 
concerning early and safe termination-of-pregnancy services.  
                                            
3  This process is demonstrated in the case of, S v Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E) to be 
discussed below.  
4  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-2. 
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2.1  The right to equality 
 
The Constitution includes the right to equality in terms of section 9, which provides 
that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law.5 Further, the right to equality includes the full and equal enjoyment 
of all rights and freedoms. Legislative and other measures may be taken in order to 
protect or advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination.6 In Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality 
Project v Minister of Home Affairs, Sachs J described equality as the right to be 
different and stated that equality requires equal concern and respect across those 
differences.7 At the very least, equality insists that difference should not be the basis 
for exclusion, marginalisation or stigma.8 
 
In view of people’s differences, the Bill of Rights is committed to a substantive 
understanding of equality.9 This approach "addresses the forces of systemic 
discrimination which, in the case of gender discrimination, often result in 'neutral' or 
'equally applied' rules having an adverse impact on women", since the biological fact 
of pregnancy and the consequences attached thereto are not taken into account.10 
The demand for substantive equality in the sphere of reproductive rights makes the 
connection between systemic discrimination against women and women's 
reproductive role.11 
 
O'Sullivan states that from a substantive perspective the right to equality requires the 
state to take positive intervening action and to provide the minimum resources 
                                            
5  Section 9(1) Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
6  Section 9(2) Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
7 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 
2006 1 SA 524 (CC) 549B. 
8 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 
2006 1 SA 524 (CC) 549C-D. 
9  Birenbaum 1996 SAJHR 488. 
10  Birenbaum 1996 SAJHR 488. 
11  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-14. The fact that s 9(3) embraces pregnancy, in addition to 
sex and gender, as a prohibited ground for discrimination acknowledges that women are 
members of a systematically disadvantaged group whose historical and current condition 
requires enhanced judicial consideration. 
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necessary for the enjoyment of certain rights.12 For example, Ngwena points out that 
public hospitals are required to provide free termination-of-pregnancy services.13 
 
The Choice Act recognises that in order to achieve equality women must be able to 
decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, since they are best placed to make 
this decision.14 In the Preamble of the Choice Act specific reference is made to the 
recognition of the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality, non-
racialism, and non-sexism. The Choice Act allows for the termination of a pregnancy 
on request during the first twelve weeks of gestation, and from thirteen to twenty 
weeks for socio-economic reasons. 
 
2.2  The right to dignity  
 
The Constitution provides that everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have 
their dignity respected and protected.15 According to National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice16 honouring someone's dignity requires us at 
the very least to acknowledge the value and worth of all individuals as members of 
society. Further, according to S v Makwanyane dignity and the right to life are the 
most important of all human rights.17 Entrenching a right to personal dignity is an 
acknowledgment that human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect 
and concern.18 O'Sullivan19 asserts that "[d]enying a woman the freedom to make 
and to act upon a decision concerning reproduction treats her as a means to an end 
and strips her of her dignity". In terms of being an individual as an end in herself, 
women should not be treated as mere instrumental objects of the will of others, and 
                                            
12  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-12. The right to equality provides women with the freedom to 
choose whether or not to have intercourse or to choose how many children to have and when, 
and permissive termination legislation is an issue of social justice and sexual equality. 
13  Ngwena 2004 JL Med and Ethics 715. However, see Harries et al 2012 J Biosoc Sci 197; Harries 
et al 2009 BMC Public Health 296. Each article demonstrates that although South Africa has this 
policy in place, the demand for termination-of-pregnancy services is rarely adequately met as a 
result of poor infrastructure, and a lack of physical space and personnel. The lack of personnel is 
linked to provider opposition to the termination of pregnancies and unwilling care providers. The 
shortage of termination-of-pregnancy providers undermines the availability of termination 
services.  
14  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-14–37-15. 
15  Section 10 of the Constitution. 
16 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) 28D-E. 
17 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 451C.  
18 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 507A-B. 
19  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-23.  
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this definition of dignity sets the standards below which ethical and legal behaviour 
may not fall.20 
 
The right to dignity has, according to Woolman, revolutionised the body of law that 
deals with state regulation of the termination of pregnancies.21 Woolman notes that 
the courts22 have expressly recognised that the right to dignity encapsulates two 
definitions specifically relevant to women in relation to reproductive rights: "equal 
concern and equal respect" and "self-actualisation".23 "Equal concern and equal 
respect" is primarily a negative obligation not to treat another merely as a means, but 
rather to recognise in the other person the ability to act as an autonomous moral 
agent.24 This approach underwrites a conception of dignity as a formal entitlement to 
equal concern and equal respect.25 As the right to dignity secures the space for self-
actualisation, women are entitled to respect, since they hold the capacity to create 
meaning for themselves and pursue their own ends.26 
 
2.3  The right to bodily and psychological integrity  
 
In terms of section 12(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution, everyone has the right to 
bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right to make decisions 
concerning reproduction and the right to security in and control over their body. The 
specific recognition of reproductive freedom was probably intended to leave little 
room for the courts to prohibit the termination of pregnancies, and this section gives 
recognition to the fact that socially entrenched forms of physical oppression and 
exploitation relate to reproduction and sexuality.27 According to O'Sullivan, section 
12(2) directly confronts the fact that women do not enjoy security in and control over 
their own bodies, taking into account the high rates of sexual violence against 
                                            
20  Woolman "Dignity" 36-9. 
21  Woolman "Dignity" 36-31. 
22  Christian Lawyers Association v. Minister of Health 2005 1 SA 509 (T) (hereafter Christian 
Lawyers 2005); Christian Lawyers Association of SA v. Minister of Health 1998 4 SA 1113 (T) 
(hereafter Christian Lawyers 1998). 
23  Woolman "Dignity" 36-34. 
24  Woolman "Dignity" 36-10. 
25  Woolman "Dignity" 36-10. 
26  Woolman "Dignity" 36-11. 
27  Bishop and Woolman "Freedom and Security of the Person" 40-80. 
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women,28 and that the circumstances in which women become pregnant are often 
beyond their control.29 
 
In Christian Lawyers 2005 it was stated that section 12(2) provides a woman with the 
constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy. O'Sullivan states that the freedom of 
choice which is entrenched in this section is reinforced by the constitutional rights to 
life, dignity, equality, privacy, and access to reproductive health care.30 Further, the 
author states that the Choice Act promotes a woman's right to freedom and security 
of her body by affording her the right to choose to terminate her pregnancy safely, 
and that the woman concerned is in the best position to make that decision; hence 
only her consent is needed.31 
 
2.4  The right to privacy  
 
The constitutional right to privacy in terms of section 14 is the right to be "left alone" 
and to exist free from state interference.32 In Bernstein v Bester the right to privacy 
was found to shield a person's inner sanctum (family life, sexual preference and 
home environment) from erosion by the exercise of the conflicting rights of the 
community.33 Privacy is based on the notion of what is necessary to have one's own 
autonomous identity.34 David McQuoid-Mason refers to personal-autonomy privacy 
rights as substantive privacy rights which permit individuals to make decisions about 
their lives without state interference, ultimately empowering them to exercise control 
over procreation, contraception and child-rearing.35 
 
Referring to the landmark American decision of Roe v Wade36 as authority, 
O'Sullivan states that a balance must be reached between a woman's right to privacy 
                                            
28  The Crime Report for 2010/2011 indicates that 66,196 cases were reported involving sexual 
offences. The report states that 35,820 were sexual offences committed against women older 
than eighteen and 28,128 were sexual offences committed against children younger than 
eighteen. (SAPS 2011 www.saps.gov.za 12). These figures reflect only reported crimes.  
29  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-17.  
30  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-15. 
31  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-18. 
32  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-8.  
33 Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) 788D.  
34 Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) 788B.  
35  McQuoid-Mason "Privacy" 38-23. 
36  Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1975). 
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and the state's interest in potential human life.37 In the Roe judgment the court made 
use of an approach linked to the trimesters of a pregnancy and stated that, as the 
pregnancy advances from the first into the second and finally into the third trimester, 
the state's interest in protecting pre-natal life becomes increasingly compelling, 
justifying interference in a woman's personal life and the decisions she makes 
concerning the continuation of her pregnancy.38 The trimester approach was 
abandoned in Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v Casey,39 where it 
was found that the state has an interest in foetal life throughout the pregnancy. As a 
result of this interest restrictions can be imposed on women, provided that women 
are not unduly burdened by the restrictions. O'Sullivan cautions that the right to 
privacy should be used in conjunction with equality rights, since relying on privacy 
rights in isolation introduces a number of drawbacks.40 She argues that it is easier to 
justify limiting women's access to termination-of-pregnancy services on the grounds 
that the termination of a pregnancy is considered to fall within a woman's private 
sphere, thus ultimately removing a duty on the state to provide public funding or to 
intervene and protect women.41 
 
2.5  The right to have access to health care  
 
According to section 27(1)(a) and (2) of the Constitution, everyone has the right to 
have access to health care, including reproductive health care, and the state must 
therefore take reasonable legislative and other measures to achieve the progressive 
realisation of each of these rights. In Soobramoney v Minister of Health42 the 
Constitutional Court found that the obligations imposed on the state by section 27 
are dependent on the resources available for such purposes. On the topic of 
progressive realisation, Madala J stated:43 
 
Some rights in the Constitution are the ideal and something to be strived for. They 
amount to a promise, in some cases, and an indication of what a democratic society 
aiming to salvage lost dignity, freedom and equality should embark upon.  
                                            
37  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-9.  
38  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-9. 
39  Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v Casey 505 US 833 (1992). 
40  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-12. 
41  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-12. 
42 Soobramoney v Minister of Health 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) 771G.  
43 Soobramoney v Minister of Health 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) 779F. 
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According to O'Sullivan, reproductive health implies that people have the ability to 
engage in safe sexual relationships and that women can safely progress through 
their pregnancies.44 Further, access to safe termination services contributes to 
reproductive health through the reduction of maternal morbidity and mortality.45 
 
Human Rights Watch recently finalised a report that focused on the public health-
care system in the Eastern Cape province and highlighted rather appalling conditions 
that pregnant women are left to endure, especially when resorting to public health-
care facilities while in labour.46 The report describes circumstances where women 
have endured verbal or physical abuse by attending hospital staff, general neglect, 
refusal of urgent medical treatment, or have been turned away when presenting 
themselves at a hospital for delivery.47 However, the report recognises that since the 
end of apartheid South Africa has passed important sexual and reproductive health-
related laws that, if implemented successfully, have the potenti al to improve 
maternal health care greatly.48 Further, South Africa has the highest per capita 
spending on health in sub-Saharan Africa, and is recognised as having a strong legal 
and policy framework, which includes a constitutional guarantee of the right to 
health. Maternity care is free and, as a result, ninety-two per cent of women attend 
antenatal care and eighty-seven per cent give birth in health facilities.49 Even with 
this framework in place, women's reproductive health rights are still being 
undermined, and the tragic fact is that many women who eventually die from 
pregnancy or birth-related causes have been in contact with the health-care system, 
meaning that some of the deaths could have been prevented.50 The problem is 
arguably not the South African legal framework failing women, but rather a lack of 
governmental accountability in the health-care system.51 
 
  
                                            
44  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-24. 
45 O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-24. 
46  Human Rights Watch 2011 www.hrw.org. Statistically, the Eastern Cape has the highest 
maternal mortality rate in South Africa.  
47  See, generally, chapter 2 of the report, "Maternity Care Failures and Patient Abuse". 
48  Human Rights Watch 2011 www.hrw.org 15. 
49  Human Rights Watch 2011 www.hrw.org 15. 
50  Human Rights Watch 2011 www.hrw.org 15. 
51  Human Rights Watch 2011 www.hrw.org 3. 
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2.6  The right to life  
Makwanyane showed that the right to life is an unqualified right.52 O'Regan J stated 
that the right to life goes beyond mere existence; it includes the right to live as a 
human being, to be part of a broader community, and to share in the experience of 
humanity.53 According to O'Sullivan, section 11 of the Constitution is promoted by 
the Choice Act to the extent that its less restrictive provisions provide women with 
access to reproductive health-care services that will prevent or dramatically reduce 
the majority of deaths associated with the illegal and unsafe termination of 
pregnancies.54 During the first twelve weeks of pregnancy only the pregnant 
woman's consent is required, and a properly trained midwife may perform the 
procedure.55 From thirteen weeks only a medical practitioner may carry out a 
termination, and after twenty weeks' gestation two medical practitioners or one 
medical practitioner together with a registered midwife may perform the termination-
of-pregnancy procedure.56 
 
This is in contrast to the now-repealed Abortion and Sterilisation Act 2 of 1975 
(hereafter the Abortion and Sterilisation Act), where in terms of section 3(1)(a)-(d) a 
pregnancy could be terminated only in cases of rape or incest, or if the pregnancy 
constituted a serious threat to the woman's life or physical or mental health. Two 
medical practitioners were required to certify that abortion was necessary in the 
circumstances indicated. Section 3(1) was further qualified by section 3(2), which 
required that the medical practitioner who certified the necessity of the termination 
could not be the practitioner to perform the termination procedure, or even be 
associated with the same partnership or employer. 
 
Ngwena states that during the implementation of the Abortion and Sterilisation Act it 
was estimated that forty thousand women accessed unsafe and illegal termination-
of-pregnancy services, and that only an average of 1,200 women qualified for legal 
terminations.57 However, in the first year of the Choice Act's implementation twenty-
six thousand women had access to safe and legal termination-of-pregnancy 
                                            
52 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 428B.  
53 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 506D.  
54  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-7. 
55  Section 2(2) Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
56  Section 2(b) and (c) Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 respectively. 
57  Ngwena (Ngwena 2004 JL Med and Ethics) refers to SAIRR South Africa Survey.  
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services.58 These figures demonstrate the gradual realisation of the value of 
women's lives in South Africa. Unfortunately the World Health Organisation 
estimated that forty-two million pregnancies were terminated world-wide in 2008 and, 
of these, twenty million were terminated by unskilled service providers using 
dangerous techniques, under unsanitary conditions, or were self-induced 
terminations.59  
 
2.7  Children's rights 
 
Children's rights are also advanced by the Choice Act to the extent that even a 
female under the age of eighteen may terminate her pregnancy without having to 
obtain parental consent.60 
 
In Christian Lawyers 2005, the Choice Act came under constitutional scrutiny. Here 
the plaintiffs sought an order declaring sections 5(1), (2) and (3), read with the 
definition of "woman", to be unconstitutional and to be struck down.61 The Choice Act 
defines a woman as any female of any age and, in terms of section 5(1), the 
termination of a pregnancy may take place only with the informed consent of the 
pregnant woman. In terms of section 5(2) and (3), no consent other than that of a 
pregnant woman is required for the termination of her pregnancy. In the case of a 
minor, it is required of the medical practitioner or midwife to advise the minor to 
consult with her parents, guardian, or a family member. Should the pregnant minor 
decide against consulting with such persons, the termination of her pregnancy 
cannot be denied on that ground.62 The essence of the plaintiff's case was that 
females under the age of eighteen years are not capable, without parental consent 
or control, of making an informed decision as to whether or not to terminate their 
pregnancy serves their best interests.63 
                                            
58  Ngwena 2004 JL Med and Ethics 715. 
59  WHO Unsafe Abortion 2. 
60  Christian Lawyers 2005. 
61  Christian Lawyers 2005 512B. 
62 Van Oosten 1999 SALJ 66 asserts that this section is justified since pregnancy and childbirth 
may not be in the best interests of very young girls or their potential children. Further, van Oosten 
asserts that this provision includes the right of a minor to refuse to have her pregnancy 
terminated.  
63  Christian Lawyers 2005 513C. The plaintiff relied on the following sections of the Constitution: 
28(1)(b); 28(1)(d); 28(2); 9(1); and 7(1). 
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The High Court held that instead of using age as a measure of control the legislature 
had rather opted to use capacity to give informed consent64 as the yardstick.65 
Where capacity to give informed consent does not exist, despite the age of the 
woman, the termination of her pregnancy cannot be effected.66 It was held that in the 
context of the Choice Act capacity to give informed consent is determined on a case-
by-case basis by the medical practitioner, based on the emotional and intellectual 
maturity of the individual concerned rather than on an arbitrarily predetermined and 
inflexible age.67 The approach adopted by the Choice Act prevents frustration of the 
minor's constitutional rights where she is emotionally and intellectually capable of 
giving informed consent for the termination of her pregnancy.68 
 
It was held that the rationale behind the requirement for informed consent in medical 
procedures brings the court very close to the founding principles from which the right 
to terminate a pregnancy in itself arises: an individual's fundamental right to self-
determination.69 The court found that the fundamental right to individual self-
determination "lies at the very heart and base of the constitutional right" to terminate 
a pregnancy, and that sections 10, 12(2)(a) and (b), 14, and 27(1)(a) provide the 
foundation for the right to terminate a pregnancy.70 Further, the court stated that 
the:71 
 
…commonality of the source of the right to termination of pregnancy with the ratio 
for informed consent, make informed consent not only a viable and desirable 
principle for the regulation of the right, but also the most appropriate. 
 
                                            
64  Informed consent consists of three elements: knowledge, appreciation and consent. Knowledge 
requires a woman to be aware of the nature and extent of the risk, and appreciation requires a 
woman to understand the extent of the risk inherent in termination procedures (Christian Lawyers 
2005 515D). Consent means that a woman must subjectively consent to the risk, and her 
consent must be comprehensive to the extent that she consents to the entire transaction 
inclusive of all of its consequences (Christian Lawyers 2005 516A). 
65  Christian Lawyers 2005 516E. 
66  Christian Lawyers 2005 516E. 
67  Christian Lawyers 2005 516D. The court further stated that the requirement that the medical 
practitioner or midwife who is to perform the termination procedure must advise the minor to 
consult with her parents or guardian is a regulatory measure of the Act, but certainly not a 
cornerstone of regulation under the Act. This regulation is subject to the proviso that if the minor 
decides against consulting with her parents the termination procedure cannot be denied 
(Christian Lawyers 2005 517C). 
68  Christian Lawyers 2005 517D. 
69  Christian Lawyers 2005 517D. 
70  Christian Lawyers 2005 518E. 
71  Christian Lawyers 2005 518E. 
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However, it was found that the right to terminate a pregnancy, like all constitutional 
rights, is not absolute, and that the state has a legitimate role, in the protection of 
prenatal life as an important value in our society, to limit a woman's right to 
termination.72 Since the right to terminate a pregnancy is a fundamental 
constitutional right, state regulation cannot amount to a denial of the freedom to 
exercise the right. Thus, the limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom as required in 
terms of section 36 of the Constitution.73 Accordingly, the court found it unjustifiable 
to limit access to termination–of-pregnancy services on the grounds of age. 
 
The court concluded that the Choice Act allows a woman with the capacity to give 
informed consent to consent to the termination of her pregnancy. Since the right to 
terminate a pregnancy stems from fundamental constitutional rights, it would be 
unjustified and irrational to limit the exercise of that right based on the woman's age. 
The constitutional rights afforded in terms of sections 12(2)(a) and (b), 10, 14, and 
27(1)(a) are afforded to "everyone", including girls under the age of eighteen, and as 
a result these girls are entitled to protection of their right to self-determination.  
 
2.8  The right to have access to information  
 
Section 32(1) of the Constitution states that "[e]veryone has the right of access to 
any information held by the state, and any information that is held by another person 
and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights". O'Sullivan argues 
that the lack of access to information concerning reproductive health will prevent 
women from exercising their right to reproductive decision making and will ultimately 
limit the control women have over their bodies.74 In terms of section 6 of the Choice 
Act, medical practitioners and midwives are obliged to provide women with 
information concerning their rights in relation to the Act. 
                                            
72  Christian Lawyers 2005 527D. 
73  Christian Lawyers 2005 527D. 
74  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-24. O'Sullivan refers to Brownfield v Daniel Freeman Marina 
Hospital Cal App 3d 405 (1989), where the Supreme Court of California held that the duty to 
disclose information about reproductive health issues arises from the fact that women have the 
right to exercise control over their bodies. This right cannot be meaningfully exercised without 
adequate information upon which to base a decision. In this case a rape victim was denied 
access to information concerning emergency contraception. 
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The Choice Act, under the direction of the Constitution, sketches an image of women 
as equal and free autonomous agents, regardless of age. Most importantly, it is 
submitted that the Constitution and the Choice Act draw attention to the fact that the 
presence of an early pregnancy is not an invitation to introduce and impose 
limitations on women, but serves rather as a ground for enhanced protection. 
Without this protection, women may in fact be reduced to substandard citizens 
merely filling a reproductive role in society.  
 
3  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act: recognising foetal interests  
 
In 1998 the Choice Act came under constitutional scrutiny in Christian Lawyers 
Association 1998. This case clearly demonstrates the status of the foetus in the 
context of the South African Constitution. The plaintiff sought an order declaring the 
Choice Act unconstitutional in the light of section 11 of the Constitution, which 
provides that everyone has the right to life. It was argued that the right to life applies 
to a foetus from the moment of conception. An exception was raised on the grounds 
that there is no cause of action, since a foetus is not a bearer of constitutional rights 
in terms of section 11, and that section 11 does not preclude the termination of a 
pregnancy in the circumstances contemplated by the Choice Act.  
 
The High Court had to determine if the word "everyone" includes a foetus, because 
the validity of the plaintiff's action was dependent on the assertion that "everyone" 
applies to a foetus from the moment of conception.75 The court stated that it was not 
concerned with medical or scientific evidence as to when life begins and regarding 
foetal development, nor was it the function of the court to decide the issue on 
religious or philosophical grounds; this, it held, was a legal issue that had to be 
decided on the basis of proper legal interpretation. The question here was not if a 
foetus is a human being, but rather if a foetus is afforded the same legal protection 
as those persons born alive. 
 
                                            
75  Christian Lawyers 1998 1118C. 
C PICKLES                                                                                PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
416 / 638 
 
Examining the Constitution, the court held that there are no express provisions 
affording a foetus legal personality or protection.76 In terms of section 12(2) of the 
Constitution, everyone has the right to make decisions concerning reproduction, and 
the court found that nowhere in the Constitution can it be said that this right is 
qualified in order to protect a foetus.77 However, this does not restrict the state from 
enacting legislation that limits and regulates the termination of pregnancies.78 
 
Had the drafters of the Constitution intended to protect a foetus, the court would 
have expected this to have been done in terms of section 28 relating to the rights of 
children.79 The court found that age begins at birth, therefore excluding a foetus from 
the provisions of section 28, since a foetus is not a child of any age.80 If section 28 
does not include a foetus within the ambit of its protection, then it can hardly be said 
that other provisions of the Bill of Rights, including section 11, were intended to 
protect a foetus.81 
 
In further validation of the conclusion reached, the court turned to other provisions in 
the Constitution where "everyone" is referred to and not where a specific class of 
persons is singled out.82 It was demonstrated that in those cases where the term 
"everyone" is used, it cannot be applied to or include, a foetus in its ambit.83 If a 
foetus were to be included in the interpretation of "everyone" in section 11, that 
action would ascribe to the term a meaning different from that which it bears 
everywhere else in the Bill of Rights.84 
 
The court stated that if section 11 were to be interpreted as affording constitutional 
protection to a foetus, far-reaching and inconsistent consequences would ensue.85 
                                            
76  Christian Lawyers 1998 1121G. 
77  Christian Lawyers 1998 1121G. 
78  Christian Lawyers 1998 1122A. 
79  Christian Lawyers 1998 1122A. 
80  It is not clear what the court relied on to come to the conclusion that age begins at birth. 
However, to justify this statement the court stated that there are certain rights in terms of s 28 
that could not have been intended to protect a foetus. These rights include the rights that relate 
to working conditions, detention or armed conflict. 
81  Christian Lawyers 1998 1122B. 
82  The sections considered were: 12(2)(a) and (b); 13; 14; 15(1); 16(1); 17; 18; 21; 30; and 35 of 
the Constitution. 
83  Christian Lawyers 1998 1122F. 
84  Christian Lawyers 1998 1122F. 
85  Christian Lawyers 1998 1122I. 
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To start with, the foetus would enjoy the same protection as the pregnant woman, 
and this would result in termination of pregnancies being constitutionally prohibited 
even when the pregnancy poses serious threats to the woman's life or where there is 
a likelihood that the foetus will suffer from a serious mental or physical defect after 
birth, or when the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest.86 It was held that the 
drafters of the Constitution could not have contemplated such far-reaching results 
without expressing themselves in no uncertain terms.87 The court found itself in 
agreement with the defendants' argument that the Constitution is primarily an 
egalitarian constitution, and that transformation of society along egalitarian lines 
involves the eradication of systemic forms of domination and disadvantage based on 
race, gender, class and other grounds of inequality. It is required of the court to have 
regard to women's constitutional rights, and affording legal personality to a foetus 
would undoubtedly impinge on these rights. The exception was therefore upheld.88 
 
This was not the end of the matter because years later Christian Lawyers 2005 
found that the right to terminate a pregnancy is not absolute, since the state 
considers prenatal life an important value in society.89 
 
The Choice Act sets out the circumstances and the conditions that allow for the 
termination of a pregnancy. Section 2(1)(a) states that a pregnancy may be 
terminated upon the request of a woman during the first twelve weeks of gestation. 
In terms of section (2)(1)(b), from the thirteenth week up to and including the 
twentieth week of gestation a pregnancy may be terminated only once a woman has 
consulted a medical practitioner and that medical practitioner is of the opinion that 
continued pregnancy would pose a risk to the mother's physical or mental health; 
that there is a substantial risk that the foetus will suffer from severe physical or 
mental abnormality; that the pregnancy is a result of rape or incest; or that the 
continued pregnancy will severely affect the woman's social or economic 
circumstances. In terms of section 2(1)(c), a pregnancy that has reached the twenty-
first week of gestation may be terminated only if a medical practitioner, after 
                                            
86  Christian Lawyers 1998 1123A. 
87  Christian Lawyers 1998 1123A. 
88  This decision has been criticized. See O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-8; Naudé 1999 
SAJHR 54.  
89  See the discussion above concerning the rights of pregnant children. 
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consulting with another medical practitioner, is of the opinion that the continued 
pregnancy will endanger the woman's life, will result in severe malformation of the 
foetus, or will pose a risk of injury to a foetus. It is clear that as the pregnancy 
progresses a woman's freedom of choice is curtailed and the decision is shared with 
a medical practitioner and must fall within one of the stipulated grounds.  
 
Although Christian Lawyers 1998 set the scene of a rather grim legal framework 
concerning foetal interests, Christian Lawyers 2005, read together with the Choice 
Act, introduced a change in approach. The restrictions contained in the Choice Act 
reveal a legislative commitment to balancing the increasingly compelling interests of 
the foetus (at and after viability) with women's rights to autonomy.90  
 
3.1  State interest in foetal life 
 
It is accepted that a foetus is not a bearer of constitutional rights, but Meyerson 
correctly points out that this does not finalise the matter concerning foetal interests.91 
If that were the case, the state would pass laws permitting late terminations of 
pregnancies for any reason whatsoever right up to the moment of birth.92 The state 
would also permit the creation of embryos for research purposes and license 
experimentation on them long past the point at which it is generally believed that 
such experimentation is acceptable.93 Women could be paid to terminate their 
pregnancies in order to ensure a ready supply of cadaver foetal brain tissue, which is 
valuable in the treatment of disease.94 
 
There is an obstacle to treating a foetus in such an arbitrary fashion. O'Sullivan95, for 
example, relies on Ronald Dworkin's96 view that arguments about termination of 
pregnancies should not revolve round whether or not a foetus is the bearer of 
                                            
90  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-27. The issue of foetal viability is discussed below. 
91  Meyerson 1999 SALJ 55. 
92  Meyerson 1999 SALJ 55. 
93  Meyerson 1999 SALJ 82. 
94  Meyerson 1999 SALJ 82. 
95  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-6. Further authors relying on Dworkin are Meyerson 1999 
SALJ 53; and Kruuse 2009 THRHR 134. 
96  Dworkin Life's Dominion. 
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constitutional rights, and that any argument that affords a foetus constitutional rights 
merely grants the state a derivative interest in prohibiting or regulating abortion.97 
 
It is Dworkin's assertion that the argument is not if we object to the termination of 
pregnancies because we believe that a foetus is a bearer of constitutional rights, but 
if we attach some intrinsic value to life and the potential for human life.98 Accordingly, 
the interest of the state in potential life derives from the state's interest in protecting 
the sanctity of human life, therefore justifying the regulation of termination laws on 
grounds that are independent of the rights-bearing capacity of the foetus itself.99 
Dworkin argues that the state has a detached interest in regulating the termination of 
pregnancies.100 This argument accords with Christian Lawyers 2005, where the court 
describes prenatal life as an important value in our society.101 This value is so 
important that it justifies limiting women's access to termination-of-pregnancy 
services.102 
 
The justification for limiting women's rights stems from constitutional values. 
Meyerson103 refers to the following provisions in the Constitution: sections 1, 7(2), 
36(1), and 39(1) and (2). First, the Constitution recognises that human dignity, the 
achievement of equality, and the advancement of rights and freedoms are some of 
the specified values that the Republic of South Africa is founded on. Further, the Bill 
of Rights affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom, and 
thus any limitations of rights contained in the Bill of Rights must be reasonable and 
justifiable in the light of the founding values. These founding values also play a 
central role when interpreting the Bill of Rights and legislation, or when developing 
the common and customary law. Meyerson states that there is more to the 
Constitution than granting and protecting rights, since it explicitly distinguishes 
between rights and freedoms on the one hand, and the values of human dignity, 
                                            
97  A derivative interest is an interest based on the presumption that the entity involved is a person 
with rights and interests, and the state's interest in protecting it stems from the fact that it is a 
bearer of rights. See Dworkin Life's Dominion 11; Kruuse 2009 THRHR 135. 
98  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-7. 
99  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-7. 
100  A detached interest is an interest based on the fact that human life is itself intrinsically valuable, 
regardless of the status of the person. See Dworkin Life's Dominion 11; Kruuse 2009 THRHR 
135.  
101 Christian Lawyers 2005 527D. 
102 Christian Lawyers 2005 527D. 
103  Meyerson 1999 SALJ 55. 
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equality and freedom on the other.104 Meyerson argues that even if no human rights 
are protected prior to birth, it is necessary to consider whether or not the value of 
human dignity might operate as a constitutional constraint on legislation governing 
the termination of pregnancies.105 
 
Meyerson states that it is the value of human dignity that is under threat, because it 
is hard to deny that the destruction of foetal life, although it violates no 
constitutionally protected subject's right to life, undermines human dignity.106 A 
foetus is not merely tissue, comparable to something like an appendix; she considers 
it to be a living organism, whose destruction is not a morally trivial matter but 
something to be regretted.107 
 
3.2  Foetal viability and the inception of state interest in the light of the value 
of dignity 
 
Foetal viability is said to occur at around twenty-two weeks of gestation.108 
Theoretically, at this point a foetus should be capable of living independently of its 
mother if it is born, since all of its vital organs are developed and are able to perform 
their functions sufficiently.109 Accepting that the value of dignity serves as the ground 
for the state to limit female reproductive rights in terms of the Choice Act, this raises 
the vexatious issue as to why the Choice Act permits elective terminations of first- 
and second-trimester pregnancies, since it can be claimed that these terminations 
also offend the value of human dignity.  
                                            
104 Meyerson 1999 SALJ 55. See Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home 
Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) 962A-C. 
105  Meyerson 1999 SALJ 56. Also see Woolman "Dignity" 36-19; 36-22–36-25, who states that the 
value of dignity can be invoked in three types of cases: where the value of dignity guides the 
interpretation of the right and by doing so shapes the ambit of the right; where the value of dignity 
can be used to justify the limitation of a right; and where the value of dignity can be used in cases 
where the Bill of Rights does not directly apply to the circumstances and, in this case, the value 
of dignity will inform the development of the common law or the interpretation of the statute 
(Woolman "Dignity" 36-24). The focus of this article falls within the ambit of the second and third 
type of cases described by Woolman. 
106 Meyerson 1999 SALJ 59. 
107  Meyerson 1999 SALJ 59. 
108  Sarkin-Hughes 1993 THRHR 89. 
109  See, generally, Cohen and Sayeed 2011 JL Med and Ethics 235. Cohen and Sayeed point out 
that there are normative societal tendencies, as expressed by the courts, to assign a particular 
point in development for foetal viability based on the estimate of gestational age. However, there 
are other factors that affect the probabilities of long-term neonatal survival, such as gender, birth 
weight, maternal exposure to steroids, and resource allocations.  
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Meyerson refers to rather controversial examples where a woman decides to 
terminate her early pregnancy because the foetus is the wrong sex or for some other 
frivolous reasons. She asserts that these issues are too controversial for the state to 
translate into law, where the foetus is still very underdeveloped.110 Further, the 
limitation clause prevents the state from limiting rights for intractably disputed 
reasons, since a person's own moral judgments do not justify legal interference by 
the state when a woman decides to exercise her choice to terminate her 
pregnancy.111 Sarkin-Hughes states in this respect that:112 
 
[D]espite the fact that not every woman's decision will be in accordance with 
another's individual sense of morality, society's interest must only be an advisory 
one. Otherwise we will be left with the dangerous and oppressive situation of the 
state imposing a preconceived moral stance, which has been created in part from 
stereotypes of women's intellectual and physiological capabilities. 
 
However, beyond early prenatal life, and once the foetus becomes more developed 
and approaches viability, its destruction at this point becomes less tied to intractably 
disputed views, and the weight to be afforded to human dignity in competition with 
female reproductive rights becomes less controversial.113 
 
Accepting the above arguments as constitutionally valid, a concern remains 
regarding the termination of pregnancies for socio-economic reasons in the second 
trimester.114 The authors referred to above describe "early pregnancy" as including 
first- and second-trimester pregnancies. However, it is difficult to accept that a 
pregnancy that has developed into the second trimester can still be described as an 
"early pregnancy". At this point, as a pregnancy develops through the weeks of the 
second trimester, the foetus begins to take the form of an infant and moves 
indisputably closer to viability. It has been stated that, according to Myburgh, 
provisions that allow the termination of pregnancies for socio-economic reasons are 
an "irrational and arbitrary exclusion of the unborn and [create] an imbalance in 
                                            
110  Meyerson 1999 SALJ 57. 
111  Meyerson 1999 SALJ 57-58. 
112  Sarkin-Hughes 1993 THRHR 89. 
113  Meyerson 1999 SALJ 58. 
114  In terms of s 2(1)(b)(iv) Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, a woman can 
terminate a pregnancy from thirteen to twenty weeks' gestation if the continued pregnancy will 
significantly affect her social or economic circumstances. 
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liberal abortion jurisprudence", because only the rights of women are advanced.115 
By contrast, Ngwena has praised South African termination-of-pregnancy laws as 
radically liberal in comparison with those of our African neighbours, since South 
Africa is one of the very few African countries that permit the termination of 
pregnancies for socio-economic reasons.116 
 
Through the lens of foetal interests, and at first glance, the socio-economic reason 
provision is arbitrary. However, taking a closer contextual look into second-trimester 
terminations in South Africa, it is argued that this provision serves a very important 
role for South African women. Of the total number of pregnancies that were 
terminated in 2009, thirteen per cent took place in the second trimester (after twelve 
weeks' gestation).117 These statistics lead one to question why second-trimester 
terminations are taking place (if not for therapeutic reasons) at a time when South 
African legislation permits first-trimester termination of pregnancies on demand.118 
Going further into the inquiry, are these decisions infused with a sense of 
arbitrariness and tactless conduct on the part of women seeking second-trimester 
termination-of-pregnancy services?  
 
Harries et al conducted in-depth interviews with twenty-seven women terminating 
their second-trimester pregnancies for non-therapeutic reasons.119 The authors 
found that women were accessing the health-care system in the first trimester, but 
that, as a result of delays, the termination procedure took place only in the second 
trimester. Delays experienced by women included a delay in pregnancy recognition, 
confirmation and response. Participants recalled signs of pregnancy, but did not 
initially link these symptoms to a possible pregnancy. One participant discussed how 
                                            
115  Myburgh Humanity and the Protection of the Unborn 60. Van Oosten 1999 SALJ 64 also argues 
that the Choice Act merely grants women the freedom to terminate a pregnancy for whatever 
reason she considers fit since the Act simply views the foetus as a "member of the pregnant 
woman's body, which includes the right to have her embryo killed." Van Oosten 1999 SALJ 76 is 
rather critical of the Choice Act and describes it as being plagued with "lacunae, contradictions, 
inconsistencies and incomprehensibilities, and demonstrates a stunning ignorance of basic 
principles of criminal law and an inexplicable ambivalence on the issue of abortion, and a 
surprising insensitivity to the meaning of words on the legislature's part."  
116  Ngwena 2004 JL Med and Ethics 715.  
117  Health Systems Trust Date Unknown indicators.hst.org.za. These statistics do not differentiate 
between elective or therapeutic termination-of-pregnancy procedures. 
118  Especially since first-trimester terminations are free at public health-care facilities; see Ngwena 
2004 JL Med and Ethics 715. 
119  Harries et al 2007 Reproductive Health 8. 
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she bought a home pregnancy test and, even after a positive result, waited another 
four weeks because she was in doubt. Women reported experiencing emotional, 
cultural and religious pressure and manipulation. Most women stated that they were 
not able to support children based on their varying personal and social 
circumstances: they were not ready, did not have the financial means, or wanted to 
continue with schooling; and one woman indicated that she was HIV-positive and 
had limited financial means. Emotional responses were fear, indecision and conflict. 
One woman discussed the guilt she felt and stated that she knew she would be 
punished for her decision to terminate her pregnancy. 
  
Harries et al further reported that some women had difficulty in accessing 
termination-of-pregnancy services.120 Many women spoke of the negative and 
judgmental attitudes displayed by staff at public facilities, of staff who were 
reportedly rude or hostile, and of some staff resorting to imposing religious beliefs on 
pregnant women by bringing the Bible to consultations. Such an intolerant 
environment consequently drove women to find other clinics and, in some cases, to 
seek help from the private sector, which not only has a financial implication, but also 
causes further delay, since women first have to save the money required to pay for 
the termination. Women were also faced with clinics that were fully booked and were 
placed on a waiting list. This caused delays, since women were required to wait a 
further two weeks for an appointment. 
 
In 2006 Chelsea Morroni and Jennifer Moodley conducted a study of 164 women 
who presented themselves for termination-of-pregnancy services in the Western 
Cape, eighty-two of whom were in the second trimester.121 The authors discovered 
that it took an average of two-and-a-half visits to health-care facilities before initiating 
the termination-of-pregnancy service. The authors state that in order to decrease the 
proportion of second-trimester termination of pregnancies the referral pathways must 
be examined, requiring speedier services for women. This is an on-going problem. In 
2011 Grossman et al conducted a study of surgical and medical second-trimester 
terminations in South Africa, which also discussed the fact that women experienced 
barriers when trying to access the health-care system for termination-of-pregnancy 
                                            
120  Harries et al 2007 Reproductive Health 8. 
121  Morroni and Moodley 2006 SAJOG 81. 
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services.122 The majority of participants reported three or more clinic or hospital 
visits, and substantial delays of up to thirty days occurring between the date of the 
first clinic visit to the date of admission for the termination services. Roughly forty per 
cent of women who required termination-of-pregnancy services were at twelve 
weeks' gestation or earlier at the time of the first visit to a clinic.  
 
Morroni and Moodley stated that all of the women seeking second-trimester 
termination of pregnancy were faced with unplanned pregnancies: twenty of the 
eighty-two women were teenagers, just over one-quarter were self-supporting, while 
thirty-eight were still in school.123 Having regard to the contextual reality that women 
find themselves in when looking to terminate their pregnancies, elective, second-
trimester termination of pregnancy fulfils a very crucial role in South Africa. It is not 
only the rights of pregnant women that are being advanced, but also the rights of 
those with whom they already share a relationship and have a responsibility of care 
towards (children and dependent family members). These women would find 
themselves in dire circumstances if termination-of-pregnancy legislation prohibited 
second-trimester terminations, especially where delays in terminations are the result 
of external factors linked to financial resources, staff attitudes, and poor referral 
systems. Although these studies were limited to termination-of-pregnancy services in 
the public sector, they do give an indication of the hardship that the majority of South 
African women face in general. It can hardly be concluded that second-trimester 
termination of pregnancies is generally arbitrarily and irresponsibly sought after or 
relied on.  
 
It also needs to be noted that second-trimester, termination-of-pregnancy services 
are not rendered on demand, as with first-trimester terminations. Pregnant women 
are required to consult with a medical practitioner, and the medical practitioner must 
be of the opinion that continued pregnancy will significantly affect their social or 
economic circumstances.124   
 
                                            
122  Grossman et al 2011 BMC Health Serv Res 224. 
123  Morroni and Moodley 2006 SAJOG 82. 
124  See s 2(1)(b)(iv) Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. See Van Oosten 1999 
SALJ 68.    
C PICKLES                                                                                PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
425 / 638 
 
O'Sullivan further states that there are good reasons for the state to progressively 
limit the termination of a pregnancy after viability. Firstly, foetal brain development is 
sufficient for the foetus to feel pain,125 which indicates that the foetus has protectable 
interests of its own. Secondly, by the time the pregnancy has reached that stage of 
development, the woman concerned has had ample time to decide if termination is 
the best option for her.126 Further, she argues that at the stage of viability the 
termination of a pregnancy becomes more problematic, because as the foetus has 
developed towards being an infant the difference between being a foetus and a child 
has become only a matter of the location of the unborn in the womb rather than its 
development.127 These arguments fall squarely in line with the provisions of the 
Choice Act. Section 2(1)(c) requires the life of the mother or foetus to be at risk 
before a termination may be granted where the pregnancy has advanced past the 
twentieth week of gestation.128 
 
Examination of the Choice Act and the constitutional provisions relating to women's 
rights indicates that female autonomy is the state's first and foremost concern. 
However, having given women the opportunity to exercise their rights during "early 
pregnancy",129 the state's interest in female autonomy weakens in favour of the 
foetus. Subsequently, the state's detached interest, based on the value of human 
dignity, serves as a reasonable and justifiable ground to limit female reproductive 
rights. 
 
                                            
125  The ability to feel pain is a contested issue. See Ford "Nothing and Not Nothing" 27. Ford argues 
that scientists disagree about the gestational age at which a foetus becomes sentient. Some 
have argued that sentience is present in the first trimester, and there are those who doubt that 
foetuses are sentient at all. Ford states that there is a majority view that sentience emerges late 
in the third trimester, and that this is based on the fact that no sentience is possible without 
cortical structure in place, which occurs only between thirty to thirty-five weeks' gestation. Also 
see, generally, Lee et al 2005 JAMA 947; Cohen and Sayeed 2011 JL Med and Ethics. 
126  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-9.  
127  O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-10. 
128  Sarkin-Hughes 1993 THRHR 89 states that it is preferred to set the cut-off line at twenty weeks 
rather than twenty-two weeks, because estimates of gestational age have an approximate two-
week margin of error. 
129 However, see Harries et al 2012 J Biosoc Sci; Harries et al 2009 BMC Public Health 296. Also 
see Ngwena 2012 www.chr.up.ac.za. Ngwena argues that the liberal termination-of-pregnancy 
laws do not always give rise to practical implementation, and that the termination-of-pregnancy 
rights may exist as paper rights only. The issue of poor access to early termination-of-pregnancy 
services makes one doubt that women have been given the "opportunity" to exercise their rights.      
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4  S v Mshumpa: Contribution to the process of balancing foetal interests 
and female reproductive rights 
 
In the Mshumpa case the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court had to deal with 
the topic of third-party foetal violence that terminates prenatal life. The two accused, 
Mshumpa and Best, plotted to have Best's pregnant girlfriend, Shelver, shot in the 
stomach under the guise of a hijacking.130 In accordance with the plan, Mshumpa 
shot Shelver in the stomach twice, causing the stillbirth of her thirty-eight-week-old 
foetus.131 Both accused were charged with the murder of the foetus and the 
attempted murder of Shelver.132 The state argued that the court should give effect to 
medical reality and community convictions and extend the crime of murder to include 
a foetus.133 
 
The court found that the intentional killing of a foetus does not fall within the scope of 
the definition of murder, as the person being killed has to have been born alive.134 
The principles of legality found in section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution prevented the 
court from extending the definition of murder to include the killing of a foetus, and the 
court was not prepared to make a prospective declaration of a new or extended 
crime, as this task was best suited to the legislature.135 
 
The court reiterated that the Constitution does not bestow any fundamental rights on 
a foetus and that there had been no South African court that had held to the 
contrary.136 However, the Constitution does protect everyone's right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, including the right to make reproductive decisions.137 
                                            
130  S v Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E) 134E. 
131  The state showed, through the use of expert medical evidence, that prior to the incident the 
foetus was viable. It was proved further that as a result of being shot the foetus had tried to 
breathe in reaction to the pain, causing it to drown in its own blood. Moreover, amniotic fluid and 
parts of the foetus's cervical spinal cord had also been shattered. 
132  S v Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E) 134B. Various other charges were filed, but they are 
irrelevant for purposes of this discussion here. 
133  S v Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E) 149A. 
134  S v Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E) 149A. 
135  S v Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E) 152E. 
136  S v Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E) 150B. 
137  S v Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E) 151I. 
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Accordingly, harm to a foetus may be dealt with through the use of existing crimes 
against pregnant women.138 
 
The court found that the two accused were guilty of the attempted murder of Shelver 
and that the aggravation of the assault, in the form of assault on the foetus, would be 
taken into consideration at the sentencing stage.139 The court stated that the 
common law crime of assault offers sufficient protection to pregnant women; this is 
as a result of the "unique togetherness" shared by Shelver and the foetus.140 
 
Even though the court did not develop the position of foetal interests in South Africa 
to the point that a foetus can be a murder victim, the decision does not bring this 
matter to an end. The court's refusal to consider the foetus a victim of murder 
ensured that the balance achieved between the Choice Act and the value of dignity 
is maintained. Had the court developed the crime of murder to include a foetus, a 
foetus would be granted the status of a legal subject and constitutional rights would 
attach to it. Female autonomy would be severely limited for the duration of a 
woman's pregnancy, and the termination of a pregnancy would be a violation of the 
foetus's right to life, even in the case where continued pregnancy would endanger 
the woman's life. This is an unacceptable consequence that the court rightly 
avoided.141 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
The Choice Act is an expression of female autonomy and gives effect to fundamental 
rights in the Bill of Rights. At first glance there is an impression that our permissive 
termination-of-pregnancy legislation deepens the tension between female autonomy 
rights and foetal interests, since the Choice Act provides women with the legislative 
                                            
138  S v Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E) 152A. 
139  1 S v Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E) 51H. 
140  S v Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E) 151I. The court stated that an assault on one is an assault 
on both. There are recommendations and suggestions being made on how to address the 
problem faced by the court in Mshumpa. See Kruuse 2009 THRHR 134; Pickles 2011 THRHR 
546; Pillay 2011 Stell LR 230. 
141  See, generally, Meredith Policing Pregnancy. The author discusses the competition between 
female autonomy rights and foetal interests in the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom in circumstance relating to the maternal duty of care, the medical treatment of pregnant 
women, and child-welfare protection laws. The author specifically links the introduction of crimes 
against foetuses to the diminution of female autonomy rights. 
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space to terminate foetal life. The decision taken by a woman to exercise her right to 
terminate a pregnancy is in opposition to the foetus's interest to continued existence, 
since a successful termination terminates foetal life. However, case law shows that 
even though a foetus is not a bearer of constitutional rights, as a potential human 
being a foetus is vested with intrinsic worth and finds worthiness in the constitutional 
value of dignity.   
 
The Choice Act is an example of how constitutional rights and values are used to 
achieve a balanced relationship between a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy 
and the value of dignity. As a pregnancy progresses up to and beyond viability, the 
Choice Act is less permissive and more restrictive. The Choice Act also plays the 
role of the protector of foetal interests and partially accommodates and shelters 
foetal interests, as far as is constitutionally permissible. Contemplating the 
circumstances in which women find themselves, the provisions of the Choice Act 
have proven to be socially relevant. 
 
Moving beyond the context of the Choice Act, Mshumpa is an example of the fact 
that the process of maintaining a state of balanced rights and interests is an on-
going exercise, and that the balance achieved by the Choice Act is relevant to all 
spheres of the law. 
 
This article seeked to demonstrate the constitutional setting of women's termination-
of-pregnancy rights on the one hand, and foetal interests on the other. It may be 
concluded that this conflicting position, rather than being deepened, is in fact 
balanced in South Africa, by legislation and relevant case law.  
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